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THE DISCRIMINATING ROLE
Philip A. Hart*
The controversy which arose in the summer of 1968 over the nomination of Mr. Justice Abe Fortas to be Chief Justice of the United States
has raised serious questions about the proper role of the Senate in
advising and consenting to such nominations. That my remarks may be
read in perspective, it should be mentioned that I supported strongly the
nomination of Mr. Fortas. I believe that were it not for the unique
circumstances of last summer- the erosion of the power of the President
with the approach of a political campaign, the nearness of the end of the
legislative session, and the opportunity the nomination afforded for political attacks on the Court and the President-the nomination would have
been endorsed by a majority of my colleagues. If my view is correct,
then the nomination procedure established by the Constitution was
thwarted by a minority of the Senate who turned events to their advantage and were indifferent to the support given the nominee by the bar, by
the academic community, by businessmen who recognized his perceptive handling of their problems and by the deprived members of our
society who felt his concern for them.
The Fortas controversy raised additional questions about the role of
the Senate and that of an individual member in confirming judicial
appointments. To what extent, as a member of the Judiciary Committee
and as an individual Senator, was I to take into account my pi"ilosophical agreement or disagreement with the nominee? Should a sitting Justice, subjected to the confirmation process just three years earlier, be
required to appear before us again at all? Was it proper for me in committee to probe the nominee's prior judicial record or to seek to defend
or challenge particular opinions? What weight was I to give the nominee's relationship to the President or to his writing, speaking and teaching activities outside the Court?
These questions do not exhaust the possibilities. Many of my colleagues thought, and have frequently proposed, that the Senate should
do more than simply say "yea" and "nay" to nominees of the President.
Some, for example, would attempt to restrict the President in the selection process, requiring him to choose Supreme Court Justices from
among sitting federal or state judges or from lists of people drawn up by
bar associations or other supposedly elite groups. Others would settle
for attempting to pin a nominee down as to his views on particular
issues, whether they be matters of obscenity, civil rights, or the relationship of government to business. Some would attempt to assess a nominee's relative hardness or softness on crime, as though that were a
sufficient test of judicial fitness.
*United States Senator from Michigan.
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From my experience I have little faith in any of these mechanical
solutions, nor does history give me any cause for optimism. Consider the
difficulties in attempting, either by legislation or by more informal
means, to define in advance the categories from which a President may
nominate a Justice. The history of the Supreme Court abundantly demonstrates that great Justices and mediocre ones have come from extremely disparate settings. State supreme courts, for example, have
supplied great Justices, including Holmes from Massachusetts and Cardozo from New York. These courts have also supplied mediocrities
whose names are better left unremembered. Moreover, for a variety of
reasons many state courts have today become relative backwaters in the
law. While this is not true of all state courts and there are state judges
today who certainly would grace the Supreme Court, how does one
define in advance a category which would limit the President to the
"great" state judges and rule out the mediocrities and the political
wheelhorses? The same can be said for the federal bench: there are great
federal appellate and trial judges and there are less distinguished ones.
A survey of the Court's history suggests that any effort to define
categories from which Justices may be selected will neither guarantee
greatness nor preclude mediocrity. Chief Justice Marshall, considered
by many the greatest man ever to sit on the Court, had virtually no legal
education and little experience as a lawyer. He was a soldier, state
assemblyman, Congressman, diplomat (accused by- historians of attempting to bribe the French), and Secretary of State. Those who propose to
restrict the scope of the President in selecting nominees would certainly
bar a man like Marshall. Or consider Brandeis, a successful corporate
lawyer who had become a controversial social reformer and presidential
confidante. The legal establishment of this country, including all then
living former presidents of the American Bar Association and the heads
of leading universities, fought the appointment of Brandeis as a Supreme
Court Justice with a venom unprecedented in our history. Think how
much poorer this nation and its judicial heritage would have been had
they prevailed. Should we exclude professors, and close the Court to
such different men as Story, Rutledge, Frankfurter or Douglas? Or
should we preclude the selection of attorney generals, knowing that that
category has supplied such different men as Chief Justice Taney, the
reactionary McReynolds, the liberal Murphy of Michigan, or Stone and
Jackson? What of prosecutors? On the present Court the most experienced prosecutor is Chief Justice Warren, hardly a hero to those
who believe the Court lacks prosecutorial zeal. Are corporate lawyers to
be excluded, although that class has contributed Hughes and Harlan?
And what about country lawyers like Jackson and Black, the one by way
of the Justice Department and the other by way of the Senate? If
anything, history teaches that no door should be closed and that diversity is the goal.
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How deeply should we ,probe the background of a nominee? Cardozo's father was a Tammany Hall judge, yet his son became one of the
saintliest figures in Anglo-American law. Stone was a rebel, both as a
college student and later as a law teacher. He was also a successful Wall
Street lawyer, an Attorney General, and a great Justice. Into which
category does he fit?
The more I read, the less confidence I have, not only in mechanical
devices, but in any kind of prediction. In the 1920's, for example, Senate
liberals engineered the defeat of the nomination to the Court of federal
judge John Parker. Parker was alleged to have made an anti-Negro slur
in a speech and organized labor was angry at his decision in a labor case.
Parker became one of our great federal appellate judges. The man the
Senate accepted in his place had been a vigorous prosecutor of the
Teapot Dome crowd, but on the bench Justice Roberts cast the key vote
in the early decisions defeating major New Deal proposals favored by
the very men who had achieved his nomination.

Toward Clarification of the Senate's Role
I appear to be advocating that the Senate continue to muddle along as
it has done in the past: approving most appointments, but occasionally
being cantankerous. But this does not mean that there are not lessons to
be learned and to be applied arising out of our experience last session
with the Fortas nomination.
First, it is the unmistakable teaching of the recent controversy that
use of the filibuster, an anti-democratic device in the legislative process,
is intolerable in the process whereby the Senate advises and consents to
a nomination to the Court. Were it not for the filibuster, Mr. Justice
Fortas would now be Chief Justice. He had the support of a majority
of the Senate. In the hands of a- well-organized but small band of men,
however, the filibuster frustrated the will of the majority. To allow this
to happen again would be to threaten every judge in the land: if he
wishes promotion within the federal court system, he had better trim his
sails and decide cases not according to the Constitution and the laws of
the land but with an eye to the prejudices of an unrepresentative group
of Senators. Such a concept is destructive of the separation of powers
laid down by the Constitution, and it is outrageous that this doctrine
should become part of the banner of men who proclaim to be strict
constitutionalists. As the Fortas experience demonstrates, the time has
come to extricate the filibuster from the Senate, root and branch.
Second, the Fortas controversy revealed to me both my own and our
society's uncertainty about the role of a Justice. Do we want men
appointed to the Court to sever all ties with the forces which brought
them to the Court? Is it appropriate, for example, for a Chief Justice
Marshall to continue to serve as Secretary of State after his entry into
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service on the Court? I suppose this question is academic today, but
there is no law which forbids such overlapping functions, and Marshall
did fill the two chairs for some six months. Do we want to erect a
complete barrier between a Brandeis and a Wilson, a Stone and a
Hoover, a Frankfurter and a Roosevelt? Would these Presidents have
appointed these great Justices had they known that in so doing they
would deprive themselves of the advice of men whose counsel-they
valued, perhaps more than any others? Do we want to prevent a Story
from almost single-handedly creating American legal education; or can
we say to a Douglas or a Black or a Fortas, "you must not write for
publication, or speak your views, or teach youngsters"? Shall we say
that they may do so, but may not receive compensation as do Senators, 1
Congressmen and other public officials? Do we want a firm rule at all?
Can we not honor both those Justices and judges who devote themselves
single-mindedly to their judicial work and those who enrich the potential
of other departments of public service? Or is the risk of diverting judicial
energies into other areas and perhaps enveloping the Court in political
controversy too great?
The time has come for the Senate, for the bar, and especially for the
law schools to focus on these problems. I doubt that the answer will be
found in legislation. However, trenchant and fair-minded analysis of
these issues, raised above the.recent controversy, could influence future
Presidents and the Senate, in addition to furnishing a guide to members
of the Court. What must be done is to create a consensus as to what
judicial propriety requires: None now exists.
The third lesson to be learned from the recent experience is that the
prior judicial record of a nominee, like his prior legal career, is at best an
uncertain guide with limited utility in determining whether his nomination should be confirmed and dangerously susceptible to misuse and
abuse. I believe it is totally unrealistic and, indeed, foolish to hold that
the Senate cannot properly consider a nominee's prior record, including
judicial opinions he may have written. At the same time, I greatly doubt
either the value or the wisdom of having a sitting Justice, whose opinions speak for themselves, personally testify before the Judiciary Committee. So long as the Senate has the power to say "no," those who wish
to say "no" will avail themselves of whatever weapons are at hand.
When the nominee is already a judge, these weapons will include his
prior opinions. Indeed, a Senator who is asked to assess the fitness of
the candidate cannot decline to see what he has written and how he has
voted.
1 The writer does not accept "honorariums" or payment for lectures or speeches. But it is

a widely practiced and presumably approved pattern.
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What struck me, especially during Judiciary Committee sessions on
the recent nomination, was the danger of irresponsible use of a nominee's prior record. Some examples will illustrate the magnitude of this
danger. One of the chief issues which arose last year concerned Mr.
Justice Fortas' position on the terribly complex subject of obscenity.
Here was an opportunity for critics of the present Court, well organized
and well financed, to use a controversial subject to punish a sitting
Justice and thereby threaten every other judge in the country. The
record gave these forces very little support. Mr. Justice Fortas had in
fact contributed the deciding vote which sustained the conviction of
Ralph Ginzburg. 2 Until he came to the Court, no obscenity conviction
had been sustained on the merits for more than a decade. Moreover,
although Mr. Justice Fortas had not himself written an opinion for the
Court in any obscenity case, one of his separate opinions made clear his
view that the states had ample power under the Constitution to protect
children from obscene materials and to protect the public at large from
panderers. But those who opposed his nomination totally overlooked his
role in these cases, choosing instead to fasten upon his votes in a
number of minor obscenity cases decided by the Court without opinion.
I deny anyone to draw any intelligent conclusion with respect to the
Justice's position on the law of obscenity from these cases. The cases, as
former Dean O'Meara of the Notre Dame Law School has pointed out,
bristle with alternative grounds for decision relating to both procedural
and substantive issues. Some cases involved genuine efforts at artistic
expression, however misguided, while others involved no more than
hard core pandering. Critics of the Justice did not make these distinctions. They used little more than case names as sticks with which to
pummel him. The same tactics characterized the attacks on the nominee's role in such sensitive areas of the law as criminal procedure and
civil rights.
How unfair these tactics are! Even when a Justice has written a
majority opinion for the Court or has written a dissent, one cannot
rightfully assume that one knows his entire position. It is impossible for
Senators carefully to examine the records in the thousands of cases
which come before the Court, much less the records on which a nominee
from a state or lower federal court has acted. Nor do we know, and it
would be highly improper for a nominee to tell us, what alternatives
faced him and had an influence on his vote. Did he vote for a position
with which he did not fully agree in order to stave off an even more
distasteful result? Did he vote out of concern for the effect of this case
upon another case, or upon another area of the law? Surely the fact that
2

Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463 (1966).
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a Justice joins the opinion of one of his brethren does not establish that
he agrees with every word, or that he would not have written the opinion
differently, or even that he would not have come out the other way if he
had the votes.
Even more disturbing, indeed frightening, were the inquiries of some
Senators as to the identity of clients the nominee had represented as an
attorney. It was improper to require Mr. Justice Fortas to justify the
pursuit of his professional duty in defending victims of political hysteria
when that was decidedly unfashionable.
In short, our recent experience demonstrates to me the need for far
greater responsibility in the use of the ammunition provided by a nominee's prior opinions. Of course, the same is true when a state or federal
judge is appointed either to the Supreme Court or to a federal appellate
bench. It is totally unfair for the Senate to attempt to second guess
opinions written in the heat of work or votes necessarily cast with little
or no explanation. One might counter that part of the fault lies with the
judges who have a duty to explain carefully and accurately what they are
doing. One might hope that this responsibility were truly reciprocal: the
courts would show legislative handiwork sympathetic understanding of
the factors affecting the writing of legislation and Congress would give
the same consideration to a judicial nominee's written opinions.
The fact of the matter is that, if we are to continue selecting our
judges in the present way, the treatment accorded prior judicial opinions
and legal background must be made more responsible. In an age when
professors and students, particularly law professors and law students,
are so vocal on so many issues, one might have expected these groups to
have addressed themselves to these matters last summer, as many did
with respect to the use of the filibuster. But few bothered to cry out
when Mr. Justice Fortas was being pilloried for the Mallory3 and
McNabb4 decisions which were decided long before he came to the
Court and in which the Court relied not on constitutional interpretation
but on the Federal Rules, an area in which Congress has always had
power to act. Only a few joined Dean O'Meara in his brave effort to
clear the air on the obscenity issue. In my judgment a certain shame
attached to this general silence.
But that is spilled milk. The profession, and especially those who
teach and write, ought now to correct those errors of omission and help
define for us some guidelines in dealing with the problems I have
discussed. To arms! i.e., to thought!

3 Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449 (1957).
4 McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943).

